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Make it too Difficult and I’ll Give-Up; Let me Succeed and I’ll Excel: 
The Interaction between Assigned and Personal Goals 
 
James Fan,1 Joaquin Gomez-Minambres2 and Samuel Smithers3 
 
Abstract 
We examine the motivational effects of setting both assigned and personal non-
binding goals on a real effort laboratory experiment. In order to derive conjectures for 
our experiment, we develop a model with goal-dependent preferences. In line with 
previous studies, we find that goal setting leads to a higher performance. We also find 
that goal-setting is most effective if subjects were able to achieve previous goals. 
Therefore, in goal setting, “success breeds success”. In particular, we observe that when 
subjects are initially allowed to attain assigned goals, they are better at self-motivating 
in the future when performing under personal goals.  
 
JEL: C91, M50, D23 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation 
Goal-setting captures a very intuitive motivational technique. A goal, even if not tied to a 
worker’s monetary compensation, can make a boring task more challenging and interesting. 
Therefore, goals facilitate pride in accomplishment fostering intrinsic motivation and 
performance. The goal setting literature, which we describe in detail in Section 1.2., focuses on 
goals assigned by a principal to an agent (assigned goals) and on goals self-set by the agent 
(personal goals). Very little is known, however, about the relationship between previous goal-
attainments and the effectiveness of goals that agents impose on themselves. 
To illustrate the importance of this relationship on work motivation and performance, let us 
consider the following example. Psychologists have shown that when students set clear and 
specific goals they are more motivated to perform than students who are just trying to “do their 
best” (Locke and Latham 2002). This type of self-monitoring is certainly an important element 
of students’ academic success. However, most teachers are aware that the goals that they assign 
as well as the feedback provided throughout the course strongly affect students’ motivation. In 
particular, when students receive a clear goal from the teacher and succeed, their commitment 
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increases. Thus, students obtain validation as they observe goal progress and feel that they are 
becoming more knowledgeable and/or skillful, which significantly increases their willingness to 
assign appropriate personal goals in the future (Schunk 1991). 
The previous example points out that the relationship between goal attainment and 
commitment is reciprocal: attaining a goal helps to increase goal-commitment, and this increases 
the effectiveness of later goals. In line with this intuition, psychology research reports that goal-
commitment influences the difficulty level of the subject’s personal goals (Locke 1996). 
Moreover, according to Bandura (1997) and Latham (2000), commitment can be raised by 
enactive mastery, i.e., the experience of success on a task. When put together, these ideas suggest 
that in an environment that alternates between assigned and personal goals (such as our teaching 
example), the best way to maximize subjects’ performance is to create appropriate attainment 
trajectories for them: In particular, start assigning low goals so as to allow subjects to experience 
success, which raises their self-efficacy and hence their commitment to subsequent personal 
goals.4  
Our experimental setting tests this intuitive idea. We consider a real-effort laboratory 
experiment with a summation task where workers are assigned, in addition to monetary 
incentives, non-binding (i.e., wage-irrelevant) goals that may affect intrinsic motivation to work. 
Our multi-period environment allows us to study the interaction between types of goals across 
time. Participants are allocated to either a control group (with no goals) or one of two treatment 
groups. The first treatment has participants alternating between setting personal goals and being 
assigned goals, with the assigned goals first being low then high. The second treatment mimics 
this but reverses the order of the assigned goals to being high then low. With this approach we 
look to study not only the effect of non-binding goals on production but also the interaction 
between past goals (either easy or difficult) and current goal setting effectiveness. 
Consistent with previous experimental results on goal setting (see Literature review), we find 
that goal-setting leads to a higher average effort than no goal. Additionally, we find that effort is 
increasing in the goal level, for both self-set and assigned goals. Remarkably, we also find that 
the previous goal level faced and whether the previous goal was achieved both have a positive 
impact on performance. This result is consistent with our theoretical framework, and it suggests 
that previous goal attainments promote current goal commitment. 
 
4 Our analysis of attainment trajectories is related to another psychology principle, namely that small wins build 
confidence to perform a task. According to Weick (1984): “If people work for something concrete, if people have an 
opportunity for visible success from which they draw confidence, and if people can translate their excitement and 
optimism into immediate action, then a small win is probable, as is their heightened interest in attempting a second 
win.” In our paper, a small win is provided when the worker attains the goal set by the manager, increasing 
subsequent goal commitment and hence the likelihood of a second win. 
 
The intuition of these results is that when subjects have attained a goal in the past, they are 
better at self-monitoring through personal goals in the future, which implies that the interaction 
between assigned and personal goals is most effective when assigned goals increase in difficulty 
over time. Our results have important implications for personnel and organizational economics. 
In particular, workers who have attained goals in the past are better at self-motivation. Therefore, 
a wise managerial strategy is to assign realistic goals that allow workers to succeed at the 
beginning of the employment relation and let them assign personal goals afterwards.  
1.2. Literature Review 
In this paper, we focus on non-binding goals; that is, goals that do not trigger monetary 
consequences when reached. In the psychology literature, this type of goals has been argued to 
enhance workers’ motivation and performance (see Locke 1996 for a review). The main findings 
of this vast psychological literature are the following.  First, specific and difficult (but perceived 
as attainable) goals leads to greater performance than vague and easy goals. Second, workers are 
more motivated (or committed) to attain goals when they are convinced that the goal is important 
and difficult to attain. Finally, goals increase persistence of workers’ effort. A meta-review 
conducted by Locke and Latham (2002) finds that goal-setting has worked in 90% of the studies 
analyzed. This evidence provides a strong premise for the assertion that goals can enhance 
intrinsic motivation if they are set appropriately. One of our main contributions is to show that 
what goals are appropriate for a particular worker depends, among other things, on the history of 
previous goal attainments. 
In the economics and management literature, a growing number of papers have studied 
why non-binding goals might be effective. Some authors have used reference-dependent 
preferences to explain the findings highlighted in the psychology literature. For example, Heath 
et al. (1999) interprets goals as reference points that alter the worker’s intrinsic utility, dividing 
the space of outcomes between gains -when the goal is attained- and losses -when the goal is not 
attained. Therefore, non-binding goals can motivate people to work harder to avoid being in the 
domain of losses. In Gómez-Miñambres (2012) workers’ types are defined according to their 
different degrees of commitment to attain goals. From a theoretical standpoint, we build on this 
idea but consider that, instead of being exogenously given, goal-commitment depends on 
previous goal attainments. This generates interesting dynamics of attainment trajectories since 
previous goal-attainments can determine the effectiveness of current goals. 
Broadly speaking, the goal-setting literature can be divided into two categories: assigned 
goals and personal goals. Assigned goals are set by a principal (employer, manager, teacher, 
etc.) to an agent (employee, worker, student, etc.) who then decides on an effort level. In a 
laboratory experiment, Corgnet, Gómez-Miñambres and Hernán González (2015) find that 
managers set goals that are, on average, challenging but attainable for workers. These goals 
increase performance and decrease time spent in leisure activities relative to other type of goals 
or to no-goals. Corgent, Gómez-Miñambres and Hernán González (2018) study goal-setting in a 
contract-design experiment. They show that low-powered incentives are easier to observe when 
managers can also assign non-binding goals to workers. Smithers (2015) presents results on 
setting a low-level and a high-level goal to two separate groups. He finds that both goals lead to 
an increase in performance over a control, with the high goal causing the greater increase, whilst 
holding the piece-rate scheme constant. Fan and Gómez-Miñambres (2019) consider a lab-
experiment to study the effects of goal setting in teams with weak-link production technology. 
They show that the most effective goals are challenging but attainable for weak-link workers. 
However, many managers fail to realize that and assign goals that are too-difficult and hence 
sub-optimal from the point of view of profit-maximization. Finally, in a field study, Van Lent 
and Souverijn (2017) study goals are set during one-on-one interviews between students and 
their randomly assigned mentor. This simple goal-setting intervention is able to significantly 
increase students’ performance in the course. 
Personal goals are self-chosen by the agent as a source of internal motivation, typically 
to attenuate self-control problems. Hsiaw (2013) considers an optimal stopping problem where 
there is an option value of waiting. By providing a reference point, goal-setting attenuates the 
present-biased agent’s tendency to stop too early. A similar approach is presented in Koch and 
Nafziger (2011), where personal goals are used to evaluate future outcomes. However, if self-
control problems are too severe, the goal can be too painful to be accepted. In a related paper, 
Koch and Nafziger (2016) explain how people face a trade-off when deciding how to set the 
brackets of their goals. Evaluating goals under narrow brackets (e.g., daily goals) help present-
biased agents to stick to their goals. However, broad brackets (e.g., monthly goals) minimize the 
probability of falling short. Therefore, when agents face significant uncertainty about their 
productivity, they should bracket their goals more broadly to minimize the risk of failure.  
Brookings, Goerg and Kube (2017) find evidence of the effectiveness of personal goals in 
a field study. They show that when piece rates incentives are accompanied by personal goals, 
performance is significantly higher than with simply piece rate. Moreover, the study shows that 
goals are higher when there are piece rates than when there are not (i.e., under purely intrinsic 
motivation). In a laboratory setting, Dalton, Gonzalez and Noussair (2016) report similar 
evidence showing that self-chosen goal contracts are more cost-effective than piece rate 
contracts, and workers choose goals which they tend to outperform. By contrast, Akın and 
Karagözoğlu (2017) do not find a positive effect of self-imposed goals on performance. 
Personal goal-setting has also been studied outside of workplace environments. For 
instance, Harding and Hsiaw (2014) show that consumers with realistic goals for energy 
conservation achieve significantly higher savings than those choosing very low or unrealistically 
high goals. In an education setting, Clark, Gill, Prowse and Rush (2017) study different types of 
personal goals among college students: Task-based goal (number of practice exams to complete) 
and performance-based goal (grade in the course). They show that only task-based goals have a 
significant impact on students’ performance. In a similar setting, van Lent (2019) does not find a 
positive effect of personal goals when college students are able to revise their goals. The authors 
justify this negative result by stating that goals, set and revised in multiple-question surveys, 
might not have been salient enough. Finally, Markle, Wu, White and Sackett (2018) and 
Burdina, Hiller and Metz (2017) show that marathon runners with a personal goal improve 
performance compared to those runners with no goals. Moreover, in these studies, goal setting 
effectiveness increases when the goal is attainable, a result consistent with previous results in the 
assigned goals literature (e.g., Corgnet et al. 2015) as well as our own findings. 
2. Theory 
In this section, we develop a simple model with goal-dependent preferences to inform our 
theoretical hypotheses. We start by describing workers’ preferences. We then discuss the 
different motivational effects of assigned and personal goals. We finish discussing how previous 
goal-attainments may affect a worker’s commitment to achieve goals. 
2.1. Worker Preferences 
We denote by 𝑦 ≥ 0 to be the worker’s performance and by 𝑔 ≥ 0 to be the goal given to the 
worker, either exogenously assigned or self-set by the worker. We assume that there is an upper 
limit for worker’s performance given by 𝑦 which can be justified by the existence of time 
constraints. The worker derives intrinsic satisfaction from attaining goals -𝑉(𝑦, 𝑔, 𝛽)- which we 
assume to be a function of the worker’s performance relative to the goal and his degree of goal 
commitment, 𝛽. In addition to this, the agent receives a monetary compensation, 𝛼 < 𝑦, for each 
unit of performance.5 We assume that this piece rate is exogenously given and independent of 
goal-attainment. Finally, we assume a quadratic cost of effort function for the worker, 𝑐(𝑦) =
𝑦2/2. Given these assumption, the worker’s utility function is given by: 
𝑈(𝑦, 𝑔, 𝛼, 𝛽) = 𝛼𝑦 + 𝑉(𝑦, 𝑔, 𝛽) −
𝑦2
2
 
We consider a worker’s intrinsic utility with two components: a goal payoff function, 
𝑣(𝑦 − 𝑔), and a goal-commitment function, 𝜓(𝑔, 𝛽). The goal payoff function shows that a goal 
acts as a reference point for worker’s intrinsic utility (satisfaction from goal attainment). For 
simplicity we assume a linear goal-payoff function6 such that 𝑣(𝑦 − 𝑔) = 𝑦 − 𝑔. The goal 
commitment function captures two fundamental ideas: (i) attaining more difficult goals is more 
rewarding than attaining easier goals and (ii) a more committed worker (i.e., higher 𝛽) derives a 
 
5 In the next subsection we explain the technical need to impose 𝛼 < 𝑦. 
 
6 Our goal-dependent utility is similar to the one proposed by Gómez-Miñambres (2012), who uses it in an 
adverse selection setting. Other authors have considered a goal dependent function consistent with prospect theory 
properties (e.g., Heath et al. 1999). A more general specification would not alter the key prediction for our 
experiments (see Footnote 3). Moreover, our alternative specification is simpler yet more in line with the 
psychological idea of goal-commitment, a key component of our paper.  
higher marginal utility from accomplishing more difficult goals. The simplest function consistent 
with this idea is 𝜓(𝑔, 𝛽) = 𝛽𝑔. Thus, worker’s intrinsic utility is given by: 
𝑉(𝑦, 𝑔, 𝑠) = 𝛽𝑔(𝑦 − 𝑔) 
Note that, in our model, easy goals have a low impact on a worker’s utility. Therefore, a 
worker has a (non-monetary) incentive to set challenging goals for himself, though this is no 
guarantee that workers will always choose the optimal goal. In fact, our model will show that 
under certain conditions, assigned goals encourage higher work performance. 
2.2. Assigned vs. Personal Goals 
We study two different types of goals: assigned goals and personal goals. As we show in this 
section, both types of goals can have differing motivational implications. Let us consider first the 
case of assigned goals. Given a goal, 𝑔, a piece rate, 𝛼, and his degree of commitment, 𝛽, a 
worker chooses a level of performance, 𝑦, that maximizes his overall utility. Thus, 
𝑦(𝑔) = argmax
𝑦
𝑈(𝑦, 𝑔, 𝛼, 𝛽) = {
𝛼 + 𝛽𝑔     𝑖𝑓    𝑔 <
𝑦−𝛼
𝛽
𝑦       𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
       [1] 
 Note that the worker’s performance increases not just with the monetary incentive, but 
also with the goal. Moreover, the goal has a higher impact on performance for those workers 
who are more committed to attain the goal.7 In essence [1] captures the idea that the worker faces 
two types of incentives to work, a monetary incentive provided by the piece rate, 𝛼, and a non-
monetary incentive provided by the commitment to attain the goal, 𝛽. Finally, [1] also clarifies 
why we need to assume that 𝛼 < 𝑦, otherwise the worker would achieve the upper limit of 
performance even in the absence of goals.  
 Let us now consider the case of personal goals. If the worker could decide his own goals, 
he will choose it in such a way that his utility is maximized given his anticipated performance, 
𝑦(𝑔). Thus, the optimal personal goal is given by: 
𝑔𝑝 = argmax
𝑔
𝑈(𝑦(𝑔), 𝑔, 𝛼, 𝛽) = {
𝛼
2−𝛽
    𝑖𝑓  𝛽 < 2 (1 −
𝛼
𝑦
)
𝑦−𝛼
𝛽
              𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                  [2] 
 
7 Note also that production monotonically increases with the assigned goal in an interior solution. This is a 
direct consequence of our linear goal payoff function. With a prospect theory function the most effective motivator 
would be a goal that is challenging but attainable for the worker (see Wu et al. 2008 and Corgnet et al. 2015 for 
analytical proofs). In other words, production should increase with the goal when the goal is attainable and decrease 
with the goal when the goal becomes unattainable for the worker. However, in our framework, the upper limit in 
production determines what goals are possible to attain. Above that, goals do not increase production, and as we 
show in the next section, unattainably high goals would diminish goal commitment. Therefore, our model and a 
prospect theory alternative both predict that higher goals are more effective than lower goals, if they are attainable.  
And the worker’s performance given this personal goal can be computed by substituting [2] 
into [1]: 
𝑦(𝑔𝑝) = {
2𝛼
2−𝛽
    𝑖𝑓  𝛽 < 2 (1 −
𝛼
𝑦
)
𝑦             𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                     [3] 
Therefore, if 𝛽 < 2 (1 −
𝛼
𝑦
), the worker always achieves his personal goal by a generous 
margin (𝑦(𝑔𝑝) = 2𝑔𝑝). In fact, in this case, personal goals would not maximize performance, 
𝑦(𝑔𝑝) < 𝑦 . Perhaps not surprisingly our model predicts that workers will not push themselves 
too hard when given the opportunity to assign personal goals.  
Note also that in [3] if the degree of commitment is high enough the worker is able to achieve 
the production limit through personal goals. This is because, in this case, the marginal intrinsic 
utility of increasing production would outweigh the marginal cost so, in effect, the worker would 
always be better off by increasing his goal and meeting it with higher production less than the 
limit.  In the more interesting (and perhaps realistic) case of an interior solution, assigned goals 
are more effective motivators when they are more challenging than the worker’s personal goal. 
Thus, 𝑦(𝑔) > 𝑦(𝑔𝑝) if and only if 𝑔 > 𝑔𝑝 =
𝛼
2−𝛽
. This implies that assigned goals are likely to 
be more effective for workers with low goal commitment, who are assigning themselves low 
personal goals.8  
In this section we have shown that goal-commitment is an essential element of the 
relationship between assigned and personal goals. In the next section we propose that goal-
commitment can change in response to the worker’s history of previous goal attainments.9 
2.3. The effect of past goals on commitment 
Commitment is the key of goal-setting. Without it, a worker will not be motivated to achieve 
his goals. Our goal commitment function 𝜓(𝑔, 𝑠) captures the intuitive idea that it is more 
rewarding to attain challenging goals than it is to attain easier ones. In the previous section we 
treated the degree of commitment to attain goals as fixed. However, psychologists often 
 
8 Since 
𝜕𝑔𝑝
𝜕𝛼
> 0, another implication is that assigned goals are more effective than personal goals when 
monetary incentives are low. Even though we do not test these predictions in our experiment, it would be interesting 
to explore in future research. 
 
9 In a previous version of this model we considered an ability parameter, 𝜃, in the cost of effort function 
(𝑐(𝑦) = 𝑦2/2𝜃). It is easy to show that an increase in ability has essentially the same implications as the increase in 
the worker’s degree of commitment: higher performance, personal goals, etc. We decided to abstract away from 
ability because it did not add anything of interest. However, there is an important difference between ability and 
commitment that we emphasize in this paper. While ability is likely to remain fixed (at least in the short-run), the 
degree of goal commitment is much more malleable and, in particular, can easily be affected by the history of 
previous success and failures as we discuss in Section 2.3. In other words, while ability is typically considered an 
exogenous parameter in models of work motivation, we argue that goal-commitment should be endogenized. 
emphasize that goal-commitment can change in response to previously encountered goals and 
experiences. For example, Gary P. Latham, considered one of the “fathers” of the psychology 
literature on goal setting jointly with Edwin Locke, states that:  
“People learn on the basis of evidence (e.g., revenue, client surveys, staff turnover) that they 
have failed to attain their goal no matter how much they truly tried to attain it. Through such 
repeated experiences they typically “learn” to give up; they learn helplessness. Thus, there are 
employees who have learned that they cannot increase revenue from existing clients, they have 
learned that they are poor at bringing new clients, and that they are not able to work effectively 
with staff. They have tangible evidence to support their conclusions that they should give up 
their attempts to attain their goal” (Latham 2000, p. 164) 
In other words, failing to attain a previous goal can diminish or even destroy current goal 
commitment. It is then not surprising that Latham (2000, p. 166) suggests that one solution for 
maintaining goa-commitment is Bandura (1997)’s proposed idea of “enactive mastery”, which in 
our environment involves sequencing assigned goals in such a way that all but guarantees early 
success for an individual.  
The simplest way to incorporate these ideas in our theoretical framework is by assuming that 
a worker is committed to a goal only if the previous goal was attained, in which case the degree 
of commitment is determined by the value of the previously achieved goal. That is, if we denote 
by 𝑔0 to be the previous goal and by 𝑦0 the previous production level, 𝛽 = 𝑔0𝟏𝑦0>𝑔0, where 
𝟏𝑦0>𝑔0 is an indicator function taking the value 1 when the goal was attained and 0 otherwise. 
To see the implications for our experiment, consider the case in which the worker produces in 
two periods. In the first period, he receives an assigned goal that can be either unattainably high 
or achievable. That is 𝑔 ∈ {𝑔𝐿 , 𝑔𝐻} with 𝑔𝐻 > 𝑦 > 𝑔𝐿. In the second period, he decides on a 
personal goal. According to our goal-setting model and a goal-commitment function that 
depends on previous goal attainments, the production of the second period will be higher when 
the worker previously received a low goal and succeed than when he received a high goal and 
failed. In particular, 𝑦𝐻(𝑔
𝑃) = 𝛼 <
2𝛼
2−𝑔𝐿
= 𝑦𝐿(𝑔
𝑃). Further, if the worker keeps encountering 
goals in the future, he will be more committed to them when he was initially allowed to succeed 
than when he failed because the personal goal, and hence subsequent goal-commitment, in the 
former case was higher: 𝑔𝑝(𝑔𝐻) =
𝛼
2
< 𝑔𝑝(𝑔𝐿) =
𝛼
2−𝑔𝐿
. 
 This simple example points out that when previous goal attainments influence workers’ 
goal commitment, they will be better at self-motivating (i.e., assigning effective personal goals), 
when they have been allowed to succeed in the past. Based on this theoretical framework, in the 
next section we briefly summarize our main testable hypotheses.  
 
2.4. Testable Predictions 
In this section, we use our theoretical framework to provide two testable hypotheses for our 
experiment. The first Hypothesis is in-line with previous results in the goal setting literature. The 
second Hypothesis is specific to our model involving the interaction of assigned and personal 
goals. 
In Section 2.2 we showed that, if the worker is committed, both personal and assigned goals 
are effective motivators and that their effectiveness increases with the value of the goal.  
Hypothesis 1 (Goal Setting Effectiveness) 
(i) We expect a higher performance with goal setting than in its absence. 
(ii) We expect high goals to be more effective than lower goals. 
Moreover, in Section 2.3 we argued that previous goal-attainments determine goal 
commitment. In an environment that alternates between assigned and personal goals, this implies 
that when previously assigned goals were unattainably high, current goal commitment and hence 
personal goals and performance decrease.  
Hypothesis 2 (Interaction of Assigned and Personal Goals) 
We expect personal goals to be more effective when the worker is initially assigned an attainable 
goal. 
We design a controlled laboratory workplace environment to test these hypotheses. 
3. Experimental Design 
 
3.1. The work-task 
We use a real effort task based on Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)’s addition task, and 
augmentation by Smithers (2015). The task consists of summing up randomly generated set of 
five double-digit numbers in five-minute segments. Subjects were not allowed to use a pen, 
scratch paper or calculator. This rule amplified the level of effort subjects had to exert in order to 
complete tables correctly. An example of the work task is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Example of addition task 
The task is cognitively demanding, it requires effort and focus to complete, it only requires 
primary level math skills, and it has been found to be gender-neutral (see Niederle and Vesterlun, 
2007). Therefore, we can assume that luck plays but a minor role in our experiment, and we can 
interpret workers performance to be strongly correlated with their effort level. Participants were 
given a full five-minute incentivized round to practice before the experiment began. Afterwards 
they faced four rounds of the five-minute addition task. We chose four rounds to minimize the 
risk of worker fatigue. 
3.2. Goal setting 
The goals in the experiment are of two forms, assigned (exogenously-set) or personal (self-set). 
We selected two levels of difficulty for the assigned goals. The low goal (L) corresponds to the 
median production in a control group who were paid piece rate but did not have goals: 10 correct 
additions. Since goals motivate workers to produce even more, we expect this goal to be 
achievable by most of our subjects. The high goal (H) corresponds to the fifth quintile (top 20%) 
of producers: 14 correct additions. Therefore, we expect this goal to be challenging for the 
majority of our subjects and even unattainable by many of them. 
3.3. Treatments 
We consider a between-subjects design with three treatments: a control with no goals and two 
treatments alternating personal and assigned goals set at the beginning of each round: Goal LH 
and Goal HL. In the two goal treatments, subjects set personal goals in the first and third round 
and received assigned goals for the second and forth round. In Treatment Goal LH the low goal 
is assigned in round two and the high goal is assigned in round four. In Treatment Goal HL the 
goals are assigned in reverse order, with the high goal assigned in round two and the low goal 
assigned in round four. The experimental design is summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1: Description of the experimental design 
 Control Goal LH Goal HL 
Round 1 No goal Personal goal Personal goal 
Round 2 No goal Low assigned goal High assigned goal 
Round 3 No goal Personal goal Personal goal 
Round 4 No goal High assigned goal Low assigned goal 
 
Subjects were informed about the order of personal/assigned goals in the instructions but did 
not know the difficulty of assigned goals.10 
3.4. Procedures 
Our subject pool consisted of students from a major US university. We conducted a total of 6 
sessions for a total of 112 subjects. The experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). The instructions were handed out as well as displayed on subjects’ computer screens.  
 
10 Screenshots of the instructions can be found in the Appendix 
Before participants attempt the addition task, they completed a short GMAT style test of five 
questions in five minutes. We use the results of this task as a proxy for subjects’ ability (Oswald, 
Proto and Sgroi, 2015). Moreover, after the addition task was completed, participants were asked 
to fill in a questionnaire asking about demographics, as well as qualitative questions related to 
goal-setting. 
Participants were paid a show-up fee of $5, rewarded $0.5 for each correct GMAT question, and 
$0.2 per correctly answered addition problem. Average earnings were $17.4 (s.d. 3.54) and the 
experiment lasted a total of 40 minutes. 
4. Results 
4.1. Goal Setting 
Table 2 presents a summary of the average number of correct answers achieved, average goal 
levels and the percentage of people who met their goals. A summary of the GMAT results and 
comparisons with the practice round can be found in the Appendix. There are no statistically 
significant differences in ability across treatments.  
Table 1. Summary of results across treatments 
Control Goal LH Goal HL 
Correct Correct      Goal     Achieved Correct      Goal     Achieved 
10.72 
(3.00) 
12.03         11.53         63%  
(4.24)        (3.69)           -              
10.99         11.59         49%  
(3.71)        (3.10)           -              
N=30 N=41 N=41 
 
Consistent with our Hypothesis 1.i, the two goal-setting treatments seem to generate higher 
production than the control. However, a difference in means test looking at pairwise comparisons 
show that only Goal LH generates significantly higher production (p-value 0.04).11 Importantly, 
in line with our Hypothesis 3, assigning low goals first and high goals afterwards seem to be 
most effective. In fact, work production is significantly higher in treatment LH than in treatment 
HL (p-value= 0.018). Moreover, workers in treatment LH achieve the majority of the goals they 
get. Finally, as we see in Figure 2 below, workers in treatment LH not only perform better than 
those in treatment HL but this difference tends to increase over time. We study these dynamic 
effects in more detail in Section 4.3. 
 
11 In an effort to remain conservative all t-test p-values are for two-sided tests, even though our data provides some 
justification for conducting one sided-tests. Wilcoxon rank-sum tests provide very similar results. We performed 
further robustness checks controlling for math skills (GMAT) and found no difference. 
 
 
Figure 2. Average correct additions (left) and attempted additions (right) by round 
 
In Table 3, we break down the information by round. This allows us to study dynamic 
effects.12 As expected, subjects were mostly successful at meeting the low goal while they 
struggled to meet the high goal. Furthermore, subjects were slightly more successful meeting the 
low goal in the LH treatment (78%) than in HL treatment (72%). They were also much more 
successful meeting the high goal when in the HL treatment (34%) than in the HL treatment 
(22%). Consistent with our Hypothesis 1.ii in both treatments, the high goal lead to a higher 
average performance than the low goal. The effect is maximized in the LH treatment which 
placed the assigned goal in the final round.    
Table 2. Summary of results across treatments by round 
 Control Goal LH Goal HL 
Round Correct Correct      Goal     Achieved Correct      Goal     Achieved 
1 (Personal) 
 
2 (Assigned) 
 
3 (Personal) 
 
4 (Assigned) 
10.3 
(2.36) 
10.20 
(3.17) 
11.30 
(3.14) 
11.33 
(3.14) 
11.32        10.15         76%  
(4.03)       (4.54)           -      
12.12        10.00          78% 
(4.19)           -                - 
12.37        11.98          66% 
(4.09)       (4.91)            - 
12.32        14.00          34% 
(4.69)            -                -              
10.99         10.32         71%  
(3.71)        (3.10)           - 
11.32         14.00         22% 
(3.72)             -              - 
11.02          12.05         32%   
(4.00)          (4.15)         - 
10.95          10.00         71%  
(3.38)             -               -          
 N=30 N=41 N=41 
 
12 Using Kolmogorov-Smirnov’s test for equality of distributions we look for a learning effect across time by 
splitting the experiment into two halves and comparing the distributions. We find that there are no differences across 
treatments, neither pooled not individually.  
Result 1. (Goal-setting). Goal setting increases workers performance relative to a control with 
no goals. Moreover, high goals are more effective than low goals. This positive effect of high 
goals is maximized in the LH treatment. 
4.2. The Interaction of Assigned and Personal Goals 
In Table 3 we show two random effects regression models on the impact of goal setting on 
worker performance. Regression (a) compares performance in the Goal LH and Goal HL 
treatments with the control group. We confirm that worker performance is greater in both 
treatments, but the difference is only statistically significant for the Goal LH treatment. 
Regression (b) reports the effects on production of current and past goal levels in the LH 
treatment compared to the HL treatment. Therefore, regression (b) help us to understand what 
determines goal-commitment. We see that the number of correct answers is increasing in the 
level of the current goal, whether that be personal or assigned. This provides further support for 
our Hypothesis 1.ii that higher goals lead to higher performance. Moreover, when looking at the 
effect of previous goal levels, we can see that it too has a positive and highly significant effect on 
this period’s performance. In fact, this effect is of greater magnitude than the current period’s 
goal. This important observation is in line with our theoretical conjecture that previous goals 
affect current goal commitment, a key driving force of the interaction between assigned and 
personal goals. 
Table 3. Random effects regressions for production 
 (a) (b) 
 Correct Correct 
Goal LH (d) 
 
Goal HL (d) 
 
GMAT 
 
Current Goal 
 
Lagged Goal 
 
Prev. Goal Attainment (d) 
 
Time trend 
 
Intercept 
 
1.513* 
(0.79) 
0.583 
(0.71) 
0.766*** 
(0.22) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.274*** 
(0.07) 
7.202*** 
(0.92) 
1.299** 
(0.62) 
- 
 
0.444** 
(0.18) 
0.273*** 
(0.06) 
0.431*** 
(0.08) 
1.336*** 
(0.41) 
-0.264 
(0.18) 
1.792 
(1.37) 
σμ  
σε 
3.250 
1.601 
1.375 
1.554 
N 448 246 
 
Coming back to Table 3, we can observe that round 3 is especially informative about the 
interaction between assigned and personal goals. While it is a personal goal round in both 
treatments, subjects in treatment LH have just received a low assigned goal in the previous round 
while subjects in treatment HL have just completed a round with a much more challenging goal. 
If previous assigned goals do not affect the agent’s goal commitment, production levels in round 
3 would be similar. We find, however, that agents production is 12% higher in treatment LH, and 
this difference is significant (p-value= 0.06). Interestingly, personal goals are also achieved twice 
as often in treatment LH than in treatment HL, despite the fact that the level of the personal goals 
set are not statistically different (p=0.942). These results corroborate our hypothesis that previous 
goals affect current goal commitment as long as they were successfully achieved, but they can 
significantly diminish goal commitment when previous goals were unattained, as it was the case 
for 78% of subjects in treatment HL. 
In line with this argument, in Table 4 we show that attaining an assigned goal in round 2 
has a significant positive effect on attaining the personal goal in round 3. Computing the 
marginal effects for round 3, we find that the probability of attaining the personal goal is 65% 
when subjects attained the assigned goal in the previous round, versus only 32% if subjects failed 
to reach the assigned goal.13 This is additional evidence that previous goal attainments increase 
agents’ commitment to current goals. 
Table 4. Logit model showing how attaining a previous goal affects the current goal 
 Current Goal Attainment Marginal Effects 
Prev. Goal Attainment (d) 
 
GMAT 
 
Intercept 
 
1.354*** 
(0.50) 
-0.153 
(0.17) 
-0.273 
(0.54) 
0.326*** 
 
-0.038 
N 82  
 
Finally, Table 5 reports regression results on how attaining the assigned goal in round 2 
affects the performance under the personal goal of round 3. The first column aggregates both 
goal treatments with the while the second and third columns deal with these them individually. 
We can see that there is a strong and significant effect on performance from attaining the 
assigned goal in the previous round. Importantly, the magnitude is greatest for the minority 
subjects who were able to attain the high assigned goal. The failure to attain the goal, on the 
other hand, has a detrimental effect on performance in the following rounds.  
 
13 This is computed using the “margins” command in Stata and it is evaluated based on GMAT and the correct 
additions being held at their mean values. 
Table 5. Effect assigned goal attainment on worker performance under a personal goal 
 Current Goal Attainment Marginal Effects 
Prev. Goal Attainment 
 
GMAT 
 
Intercept 
 
1.354*** 
(0.50) 
-0.153 
(0.17) 
-0.273 
(0.54) 
0.326*** 
 
-0.038 
N 82  
 
Result 2. (Interaction of Assigned and Personal Goals).  
i. Worker performance is maximized in Treatment LH. Performance is Treatment HL is 
not significantly higher than in the absence of goals. 
ii. Personal goals do not seem to be affected by previous goals. However, attaining an 
assigned goal in the past increases the probability of attaining personal goals.  
iii. Attaining a high assigned goal in the past maximizes goal commitment. 
The previous results are in line with the idea of "enactive mastery" (Bandura 1997) that, as we 
emphasized in Section 2.3, is an important implication of our goal commitment function. In 
particular, we have shown that by Round 3 subjects in the LH group are able to significantly 
outperform subjects in the other two treatments because they previously received a goal that 
most of them were able to attain (see Table 4), increasing their goal commitment and hence 
production in future rounds (see Table 5).   
Conclusion 
In this paper we have shown that the interaction between personal and assigned goals is a crucial 
component of effective work motivation. We have provided theoretical arguments and 
experimental evidence that in an environment alternating personal and assigned goals, increasing 
assigned goals over time is most conducive for workers performance. By allowing workers to 
succeed with easy goals in early rounds, subjects are most committed to their goals in future 
rounds. Therefore, setting goals that facilitate workers’ attainment trajectories increases goal 
commitment through enactive mastery. 
Our results have important implications for organizational economics. They indicate that 
organizations that allow workers to experience success and build confidence at the beginning of 
the employment relation are able not only to increase performance, but also likely to make 
workers better at self-motivating through personal goals in the future. This highlights the 
importance of studying different types of incentives as well as their interdependences in order to 
provide effective guidance to practitioners.  
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APPENDIX 
A1. GMAT Results 
 Table A1 summarizes the average GMAT scores across treatments. Pairwise comparison 
shows that there is no significant difference between the GMAT scores of the treatments. This 
signifies that there are no significant differences between the mathematical ability of our 
participants. 
Table A1. Summary of GMAT Scores by Treatment 
 Aggregate Control Goal LH Goal HL 
Mean 3.089 
(1.40) 
3.333 
(1.24) 
3.073 
(1.31) 
2.927 
(1.59) 
Obs. 112 30 41 41 
 
A2. Comparison to the practice round 
 The table below summarizes how much the performance of the participants improved 
from the practice round by subtracting their round performance from their practice performance. 
Table A2. Summary of Results by Round with Practice Performance Subtracted 
 Aggregate Control Goal LH Goal HL 
Round Correct Correct Correct Correct 
P 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
- 
- 
1.65 
(2.38) 
2.23 
(2.80) 
2.51 
(2.74) 
2.47 
(2.72) 
- 
- 
1.23 
(1.96) 
1.40 
(2.39) 
2.50 
(2.19) 
2.53 
(2.62) 
- 
- 
2.02 
(2.54) 
2.83 
(2.67) 
3.07 
(2.68) 
3.02 
(2.86) 
- 
- 
1.59 
(2.49) 
2.24 
(3.10) 
1.95 
(3.10) 
1.88 
(2.59) 
Obs. 112 30 41 41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A3. Experiment Instructions (Goal Setting Treatments) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
